Five to Four over Spirited Dissent: Justification to Overrule - Payne v. Tennessee by Shaw, Lynn McCreery
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 Vol. 13 Iss. 2 Article 9 
1993 
Five to Four over Spirited Dissent: Justification to Overrule - Payne 
v. Tennessee 
Lynn McCreery Shaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 419 (1992-1993) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
"FIVE TO FOUR OVER SPIRITED DISSENT":
JUSTIFICATION TO OVERRULE?
Payne v. Tennessee,
I11 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)
Lynn McCreery Shaw
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1978,' at least thirty-six states have adopted legislation requiring victim
impact evidence to be presented in criminal trials.2 The United States Congress
has also enacted such a statute called the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982.1 This relatively recent proliferation of legislation has raised the constitu-
tional question of whether such evidence is prohibited in capital sentencing by the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.4
In 19871 and again in 1989,6 the United States Supreme Court held that victim
impact statements7 were a violation of the Eighth Amendment.I In June of 199 1,9
1. Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, 11 PEPP. L. REv.
23, 51 (1984) [hereinafter Hudson].
2. Hudson, supra note 1, at 51.
3. Pub. L. No. 97-291,96 Stat. 1242 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1988)). The Act states: "The Congress
finds and declares that: Without the cooperation of victims and witnesses the criminal justice system would cease
to function; yet with few exceptions these individuals are either ignored by the criminal justice system or simply
used as tools to identify and punish offenders." Id. § 2(a)(1). "This is the single most important and comprehen-
sive piece of federal legislation on behalf of crime victims to ever come out of Congress." Frank Carrington &
George Nicholson, The Victim s Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, II PEP. L. REv. 1, 8 (1984). See
also FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(c)(2).
4. Compare Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) with Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
5. Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
6. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
7. Victim impact statements include a description of the emotional trauma suffered by the victim's family
and the personal characteristics of the victims, as well as the family members' opinions and characterizations of
the crime and the defendant. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03. Justice Brennan fbund that the offering of this infbrma-
tion by the prosecutor is "indistinguishable in any relevant respect" from a victim or the victim's family offering
such information. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811. Under the various statutory schemes, there are basically two models
of victim impact statements: "Model #1: The preparation and presentation of a written victim impact statement,
to be introduced at the sentencing hearing or plea negotiation .... Model #2: The presentation of an oral state-
ment at the sentencing hearing or plea negotiation. . . ." Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing,
22 CiuM. L. BULL. 501,503-04 (1986) [hereinafter McLeod].
8. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811; Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
9. Payne v. Tennessee, I I I S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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however, the Court changed its mind, deciding in Payne v. Tennessee1" that victim
impact evidence1' was admissible during sentencing in a death penalty case.12
II. FACTS
On June 27, 1987, twenty-eight year old Charisse Christopher, her two-and-
one-half year old daughter, Lacie, and her three-and-one-half year old son, Ni-
cholas, were brutally stabbed at their apartment in Millington, Tennessee, outside
of Memphis.' Charisse died of forty-one knife thrusts which caused forty-two
wounds and forty-two defensive wounds to her arms and hands. 4 Lacie received
nine stab wounds to her head, abdomen, back and chest, one of which cut her
aorta causing almost immediate death.15 Nicholas survived several stab wounds,
which penetrated completely through his body from front to back but only after
seven hours of surgery requiring a massive blood transfusion and two additional
operations.16 The defendant, Pervis Tyrone Payne, was convicted of first degree
murder of Charisse and Lacie and of first degree assault of Nicholas with intent to
commit murder.17 Payne received a death sentence for each of the murders and
was sentenced to thirty years in prison for the first degree assault.' 8
During the sentencing phase of Payne's trial, the defense presented the testi-
mony of Payne's girlfriend, Bobby Thomas, who lived across the hall from the
victims.19 The defense also presented the testimony of Payne's parents and Dr.
John T. Hutson, a psychiatrist who tested Payne three months after the crimes.20
Ms. Thomas and the defendant's parents testified that Payne was caring, did not
abuse alcohol or drugs, worked responsibly as a painter with his father and was
good with children. 21 Dr. Hutson stated that based on the tests he had conducted,
10. Id.
11. "The term 'victim impact evidence,' reflecting the type of information contained in [a victim impact state-
ment], encompasses a broad range of factual, opinion, and documentary evidence" the admissibility of which,
according to the Booth rationale, depends on its characterization as a circumstance of the crime. Charlton T. Ho-
ward, III, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement, 47 MD. L. Rav. 701 n.2
(1988) [hereinafter Howard].
12. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
13. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tenn. 1990).
14. Id. at 12.
The medical examiner testified that the forty-two (42) knife wounds represented forty-one (41) thrusts of
the knife, "because there was one perforated wound to her left side that went through her -went through
her side. In and out wounds produce two." He said no wound penetrated a very large vessel and the cause
of death was bleeding from all of the wounds; there were thirteen (13) wounds "that were very serious





17. Id. at 11.
18. Id.





Payne was "mentally handicapped" but not psychotic or schizophrenic.22 He also
testified that Payne was one of the most polite people he had ever interviewed in
jail. 23
The State responded with the testimony of Charisse's mother, who stated that
Nicholas cried for his mother and sister and could not understand what had hap-
pened to them. 24 The prosecution's second witness, a detective with the Mil-
lington Police Department, identified a videotape he had made of the crime scene,
and it was played for the jury over objection.2
In her closing argument during sentencing, the prosecutor reminded the jury
about the victim's side of the story. She stated that because Nicholas was con-
scious when the paramedics arrived, he had seen what happened to his mother and
sister. 28 She went on to assert that later in life Nicholas would want to know ifjus-
tice was done and that the jury could give him that answer with its verdict. 27 The
prosecution made the alleged impact of the crime on Nicholas more vivid with
statements such as "Nicholas' mother [won't be] there to kiss him goodnight," and
"[Nicholas] mourns for [Lacie] every single day and wants to know where his best
little playmate is. "28
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that the
death penalty was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases29 and that the admission of victim impact evidence was harmless er-
ror.3" The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider its hold-
ings in Booth v. Maryland3 and South Carolina v. Gathers,32 which prohibited
capital sentencing juries from hearing victim impact statements concerning "the
personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on
the victim's family."33 Affirming the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision,34 the
22. Id.
[Dr. Hutson] gave [Paynel the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) revised version. [Payne's]
scores were Verbal IQ 78, Performance IQ 82 .... He testified that the theoretical norm is 100, that




24. Id. at 17-18.
25. Id. at 17.
26. d. at 18.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Id. at21.
30. Id. at 19.
31. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991). The Booth Court held
that admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and
the appropriate sentence, violated the Eighth Amendment. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09.
32. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). The Court's holding in
Gathers extended its holding in Booth to prosecutorial comment concerning the information in a victim impact
statement. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
33. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2604.
34.Id. at 2611.
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United States Supreme Court overruled its decisions in Booth and Gathers,35 hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment does not bar a capital sentencing jury from consid-
ering victim impact evidence.3"
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
and the Death Penalty
Before the consequences of the Payne decision can be fully appreciated, it is
necessary to examine the arduous journey of the death penalty through United
States history. Adopted as part of the United States' English common law heritage,
the death penalty was mandatory for all convicted murderers." Then in 1791, the
Eighth Amendment3" became a part of our Constitution, 9 having been adopted
verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.1 It was eighty years before the
Supreme Court was asked to interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.4' The accepted interpretation of the clause from adoption to the 1909 Su-
preme Court decision of Weems v. United States42 was that it prohibited certain
methods of punishment thought to be barbaric and torturous.4
Before Weems, popular sentiment led to a revision of the common law rule im-
posing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." Pennsylvania
took the lead when, in 1794, it statutorily abolished mandatory capital punishment
35. Payne, 11 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2.
36. Id. The Court also held that stare decisis did not require the Court to follow prior precedents. Id. Discus-
sion of stare decisis is beyond the scope of this article and has been adequately covered in many scholarly works.
See Herbert C. Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 238 (1959); Earl Maltz, The Nature of
Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
CoLuM. L. Rv. 723 (1988); Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View, 10 HAsTINGs L.J. 394 (1959);
Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1344 (1990).
37. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (examining the history of the death penalty). Sta-
tistical studies indicate that the death penalty was often commuted. HuGo G. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 366 (3d ed. 1982). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that a substantial number of death sentences had been commuted).
38. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fimes imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIlI.
39. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289.
40. Anthony F Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: "The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L.
Rav. 839, 840 (1969) [hereinafter Granucci].
4 1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Pervear v. Commonwealth,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1867). The plaintiff in Pervear was charged with "keeping and maintaining,
without a license, a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors," the punishment for
which was "fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for three months." Id. at 480.
The Court held that this was not cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
42. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (re-
viewing the history of the Eighth Amendment) which stated:
These early cases. . . did not undertake to provide "an exhaustive definition" of"cruel and unusual pun-
ishments." Most of them proceeded primarily by "looking backwards for examples by which to fix the
meaning of the clause," concluding simply that a punishment would be "cruel and unusual" if it were simi-
lar to punishments considered "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
44. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (recounting the history of the death penalty).
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except for first degree murder which it defined as a willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing."' Unfortunately, this measure and similar ones in other states
did not remove the problem of jury nullification inherent in the mandatory death
penalty, i.e., jurors '"disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict.""' Thus
in 1837, Tennessee adopted a statute giving juries sentencing discretion in capital
cases, and the federal government adopted such a statute in 1897. 47
The Weems decision expanded the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to
include any instance of disproportionate punishment." Underlying the principle of
proportionality was the lex talionis, given to Moses by Yahweh, "an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth." 49 In modern terms, proportionality means that the punishment
must fit the crime, implying that excessive punishments are unconstitutional.50
However, it was not this expanded view of the Eighth Amendment that called into
question the constitutionality of the death penalty. Instead, the belief that discre-
tionary jury sentencing resulted in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty caused the constitutional issue to be raised.51
"Prior to Furman v. Georgia52 . . . every state that authorized capital punish-
ment had abandoned mandatory death penalties, and instead permitted the jury
unguided and unrestrained discretion regarding the imposition of the death pen-
alty in a particular capital case. "5 This change addressed the earlier mentioned
problem of jury nullification. 54 Despite juror aversion to the automatic death pen-
alty, the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of mandatory stat-
utes, 5 and prior to Furman, the Court never held that discretionary jury
sentencing in capital cases was unconstitutional. 51 In fact, in McGautha v. Califor-
nia,57 decided only one year before Furman, the Supreme Court held that discre-
tionary sentencing did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
45. Id. (citation omitted). "Except for four states that entirely abolished capital punishment in the middle of
the last century, every American jurisdiction has at some time authorized jury sentencing in capital cases." Id. at
200 n. 11 (citations omitted). "It has been suggested that [the practice ofjury sentencing] was a 'reaction to harsh
penalties imposed by judges appointed and controlled by the Crown' and a result of 'the early distrust of govern-
ment power.'" Id. at n. 10 (citations omitted).
46. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1978) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293
(1976)).
47. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 200.
48. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
49. Granucci, supra note 40, at 844 (footnote omitted).
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
51. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598-99 (1978).
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
53. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597-98 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291-92 & n.25 (1976)).
54. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
55. Id. at 296.
56. Locket, 438 U.S. at 598.
57. 402 U.S. 183 (197.1).
58. Id. at 207-08.
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Furman changed all of this. Decided in 1972, the Furman Court held that:
[D]iscretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively defined standards, violated
the Eighth Amendment because it was "pregnant with discrimination," 9 . . . per-
mitted the death penalty to be "wantonly" and "freakishly"6 0 imposed, and ... im-
posed the death penalty with "great infrequency" [which] afforded "no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed from the many cases
in which it [was] not .... 61
Although the Supreme Court had been called on to decide the constitutionality of
capital punishment per se, the Court did not definitively resolve the issue. 2 In five
separate concurring opinions, Justices Douglas, Stewart and White concluded
only that imposing the death penalty under the statutory scheme in this case would
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,63 while Justices Brennan and
Marshall held that capital punishment was unconstitutional per se. In their dis-
senting opinions, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist determined that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se.65
In response to the Furman decision, many states adopted mandatory death pen-
alties for certain crimes and other states continued to use discretionary sentencing
but developed "standards to guide the sentencing decision." 66 The question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty was revisited four years after Furman in con-
nection with five post-Furman death penalty statutes.67 In the leading case of
59. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (first alteration in original).
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 & n. 15 (1976) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., con-
curring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring)).
63. Id. at 169 & n. 15. Justice Douglas stated that "these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their
operation." Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded that "the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
White could not "avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so infre-
quently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id.
at 313 (White, J., concurring).
The full text of the Eighth Amendment can be found supra note 38. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 & n. 14. Justice Brennan held that "[w]hen examined by the principles applicable
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.
The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual'. . . ." Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
65. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169& n.13.
66. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,600 (1978).
67. Id. at 600-01 & n.10.
[Vol. 13:419
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Gregg v. Georgia88 and its companion cases, Jurek v. Texas, 9 Proffitt v. Florida,7 °
Woodson v. North Carolina,71 and Roberts v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court held
that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se.
The [plurality] opinion [of Gregg] reasoned that, to comply with Furman, sen-
tencing procedures should not create "a substantial risk that the death penalty [will]
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." In the view of the three Justices,
however, Furman did not require that all sentencing discretion be eliminated, but
only that it be "directed and limited," so that the death penalty would be imposed in a
more consistent and rational manner and so that there would be a "meaningful basis
for distinguishing the. . . cases in which it is imposed from. . . the many in which
it is not." The plurality concluded, in the course of invalidating North Carolina's
mandatory death penalty statute, that the sentencing process must permit consider-
ation of the "character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of in-
flicting the penalty of death," in order to ensure the reliability, under Eighth Amend-
ment standards, of the determination that "death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case."
74
The plurality opinion of Gregg was based on history, legislative enactments and
jury decisions regarding the imposition of capital punishment.7"
In addressing whether or not a particular death penalty statute violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court in Lockett v. Ohio76 stated that
these amendments "require that the sentencer. . . not be precluded from consid-
ering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
68. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
69. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
70. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
71. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
72. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
73. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976).
74. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (citations omitted). The plurality in Gregg, consisted of Jus-
tices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. The precedential value to lower courts of plurality opinions by the United
States Supreme Court can be a very confusing issue. Marks v. United States offers some guidance: "When a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in thejudgments on
the narrowest grounds. . . .- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at
169 n. 15). The Third Circuit provided further insight regarding this issue in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "The
binding opinion from a splintered decision [of the United States Supreme Court] is as authoritative for lower
courts as a nine-Justice opinion. While the opinion's symbolic and perceived authority, as well as its duration,
may be less, that makes no difference for a lower court." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F2d 682, 694 (3d
Cir. 1991). See also Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 756, 757 n.7 (1980).
75. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-82. Justice White, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens which held that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se
and that the statutory system under review did not violate the Constitution. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J.,
concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226 (Burger, J., concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring).
76. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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sentence less than death."77 Common law principles as codified in Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure78 support the Locket decision.
B. Victims'Rights and the Victim Impact Statement
Throughout the previously discussed death penalty jurisprudence there was no
mention of victim impact evidence. However, "[d]emands for ... legislative re-
form in the arena of victims' rights have been voiced in more recent years."79 The
federal government and many states have addressed this reform movement:
In passing the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Congress amended [Rule
32 of] the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to mandate inclusion of a victim im-
pact statement in federal presentence reports. Since 1978, at least thirty-six states
have followed the federal government in enacting some variation of VIS [victim im-
pact statement] legislation.80
In 1986, Maryland adopted a statute, similar to the federal statute mentioned
above, which required the inclusion of a victim impact statement in the presen-
tence report in any felony case. 1 In Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Maryland statute allowing the sentencing jury in a capital murder
trial to hear victim impact evidence violated the Eighth Amendment.82 The victim
impact statements in Booth described the severe emotional impact of the brutal
murder of the Bronsteins, an elderly couple, on their son, daughter, son-in-law,
and granddaughter,83 as well as the personal characteristics of the victims.84 It fur-
ther stated the family members' opinions of the crime and of the perpetrator.8" The
77. Id. at 604.
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
79. McLeod, supra note 7, at 502; see Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action:
An Overview of Issues and Problems, II PEPP. L. REv. 117 (1984); ABA GUIDEINES FOR TREATMENT OF VICriMs
AND WITNESSES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983).
80. McLeod, supra note 7, at 507 (footnote omitted). The federal presentence report contains "information
about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial condition,
and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence. . . and such
other information as may be required by the court." FED. R. CruM. P. 32(c)(2). The presentence report is pre-
pared by the probation service of the court but its contents are not disclosed to anyone unless the defendant pleads
guilty or nolo contendere or has been found guilty. Id. at 32(c)(1). Even then, the report in its entirety may not be
disclosed to the defendant and his counsel. Rather, the court may choose to summarize the contents of the report
or hold that no finding was made as to the undisclosed information, because it would not be considered during
sentencing. FED. R. CriM. P. 32 advisory committee's notes on 1989 amendments. See also Tim A. Thomas,
Annotation, Disclosure to Third Party of Presentence Report Under Rule 32(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 91 A.L.R. FED. 816 (1989) (collecting and discussing federal cases ruling on the permissibility of disclos-
ing presentence report, either in whole or in part, to a third party); Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Defendant's Right
to Disclosure ofPresentence Report, 40 A.L.R. 3d 681 (1971).
81. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,498 (1987) (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1957)), over-
rided by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
82. Id. at 497.
83. Id. at 499. The son said he suffered from lack of sleep and depression, and the daughter said she also suf-
fered from lack of sleep and had become withdrawn and distrustful. The granddaughter discontinued counseling
after several months concluding that "no one could help her." Id. at 499-500.
84. Id. at 499-500 n.3.
85. Id. at 500. The Bronsteins' son stated that his parents were "butchered like animals" and their daughter
opined that the murderer could "[nlever be rehabilitated." Id.
[Vol. 13:419
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Court concluded that the use of victim impact statements during the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment because "this infor-
mation is irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and. its admission creates
a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in
an arbitrary and capricious manner."" As to the emotional impact on surviving
family members, the Court reasoned that focusing on such information impermis-
sibly took the sentencer's attention away from the defendant and placed it on the
victim and his family,87 ran the risk of giving undue advantage to victims who bet-
ter articulate their grief,88 created the potential for sentencing harshness based on a
juror's perception of the worth of the victim,89 and provided for a potential "mini-
trial" on the victim's character."
Two years after deciding Booth, the Supreme Court again considered the ad-
missibility of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing.9 In South Caro-
lina v. Gathers, the prosecutor made "extensive comments to the jury regarding
the victim's character."92 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated that al-
though the victim was characterized in Gathers by the prosecutor rather than by
the victim's family members as in Booth, the victim impact statements in both
cases were "indistinguishable."93 While Booth "left open the possibility that...
victim impact statements could be admissible if. . . 'relate[d] directly to the cir-
cumstances of the crime,"'94 the Gathers majority held that the victim impact evi-
dence in question did not meet this limitation, and, therefore, its admission
violated the principle of proportionality on which the Eighth Amendment is
based.95
IV. INSTANT CASE
In Payne v. Tennessee,"8 the Supreme Court "reconsider[ed] [its] holdings in
Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers... that the Eighth Amendment
bars the admission of victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital
trial.""' The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the admission of the grandmoth-
er's testimony and the State's closing argument during Payne's sentencing were
harmless error.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-Justice majority, held that victim impact
86. Id. at 502-03.
87. Id. at 504.
88. Id. at 505.
89. Id. at 506.
90. Id. at 507.
91. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
92. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
93. Id. at 811.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 811-12.
96. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
97. Id. at 2601 (citations omitted).
98. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990).
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evidence is admissible during capital sentencing, thereby eliminating the need for
harmless error analysis.99
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion with some historical background in
support of the general proposition that "the assessment of harm caused by the de-
fendant as a result of the crime charged [is] an important concern of the criminal
law . . in determining the appropriate punishment.""' The Chief Justice then
applied this general proposition to the victim impact statement and asserted that
the Booth Court misread the statement in Woodson v. North Carolina requiring that
the capital defendant be treated as a '"uniquely individual human bein[g] .,,,101 In-
stead of intending to describe a class of evidence that could not be received,I0 2 the
Court compared the Woodson language with the following language from Gregg v.
Georgia, decided the same day as Woodson:
"We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary re-
strictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open
and far-ranging argument .... So long as the evidence introduced and the argu-
ments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable
not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much infor-
mation before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision."0
03
Based on this comparison, the majority concluded that the Woodson language de-
scribed a class of evidence which must be heard.104
The Court reasoned that if such victim impact evidence was not received, the
sentencing trial would be "unfairly weighted" in favor of the defendant since he or
she can introduce relevant mitigating evidence while the victim cannot put on rele-
vant aggravating evidence."10 In so holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
reasoning in Booth that victim impact evidence would create a "mini-trial' on the
victim's character"0 6 possibly resulting in a jury basing its punishment decision on
the victim's perceived worth to the community.10 7 The Chief Justice's rejection
was based on two arguments: (1) the jury already heard the victim impact evi-
dence because of its relevance to the guilt phase of the trial, and (2) victim impact
evidence is designed to show the victim's "uniqueness" and not to encourage com-
parative value judgments of a victim's worth."0
The majority concluded its opinion by justifying its decision not to follow the
Booth and Gathers precedents: "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command;
99. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
100. Id. at 2605.
101. Id. at 2606-07 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
102. Id. at 2607.
103. Id. at 2606 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976)).
104. Id. at 2607.
105. Id.






rather it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision.' This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such
cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible.""" Applying
these general principles, the Chief Justice recounted that Booth and Gathers were
five-to-four decisions with spirited dissents, have been questioned by the Court in
later decisions, and have not been consistently applied by lower courts.1"' Chief
Justice Rehnquist also noted that in the last twenty terms, the Court had overruled
thirty-three previous decisions." 1
In her concurring opinion," 2 Justice O'Connor emphasized that although vic-
tim impact evidence may inflame the jury, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and not Booth's "prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that
this evidence may never be admitted" offers the proper remedy."13 Justice O'Con-
nor reiterated that the Court's holding was not that victim impact evidence must be
admitted nor that it should be admitted. 4 Rather, the Court held only that if states
permit consideration of victim impact evidence, "the Eighth Amendment erects
no per se bar."1
5
Justice Souter, concurring,... stated that "Booth sets an unworkable standard of
constitutional relevance that threatens ...to produce . . . arbitrary conse-
quences and uncertainty of application.""' 7 Justice Souter urged that the Booth
standard, when taken to its full extent, means that victim impact evidence would
have to be excluded at the guilt phase, too."18 This exclusion of information about
circumstances surrounding the crime would leave jurors unable to understand
what happened." 9 The only alternative would be to have separate guilt and sen-
tencing trials, which could be a "major imposition on the States." 20
In his dissenting opinion,' 2 ' Justice Marshall denounced the majority's refusal
to follow Booth and Gathers. '22 Justice Marshall assessed the majority's arguments
and concluded that "[tihere [was] nothing new in the majority's discussion of the
supposed deficiencies in Booth and Gathers. Every one of the arguments made by
the majority [could] be found in the dissenting opinions filed in those two cases,
and. . . each argument was convincingly answered by Justice Powell and Justice
Brennan."'23 Justice Marshall thus asserted that "[t]he real question . . .[was]
109. Id. at 2609-10 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 2610-11.
111. Id. at 2610&n.l.
112. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2612.
114.Id.
115. Id.
116. Payne, I11 S. Ct. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2616.
118. Id. at 2617.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Payne, I IIS. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2619.
123. Id. at 2620.
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whether [the] majority ha[d] come forward with the type of extraordinary show-
ing that this Court has historically demanded before overruling one of its prece-
dents." 24 Rather than finding the "special justification" required to overrule
precedent, Justice Marshall stated flatly that "[n]either the law nor the facts sup-
porting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the
personnel of this Court did."125
Justice Stevens, in his dissent,1 26 addressed the majority's unfairness argu-
ment. 27 He reminded the majority that although this issue has "strong political ap-
peal . . . [t]he victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot
therefore constitute either an aggravating or mitigating circumstance." 28 Justice
Stevens stated that, as evidenced by the heavy burden of proof placed on the prose-
cution and the weighing of the rules of evidence in the defendant's favor, a balance
between the State and the defendant was not required. 
129
V. ANALYSIS
The doctrine of stare decisis is central to the reliability and credibility of our
judicial system. 3' Hence, overruling precedent prior to Payne had supposedly
been done only with "special justification."' 1 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
in the majority opinion, reminded us that "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand" 32 and adherence should not be required "when governing decisions are un-
workable or are badly reasoned." 3 The Chief Justice gives a paucity of support, if
any, for overruling Booth and Gathers. 13 A majority of the nine Justices is all that
is required for a given Supreme Court decision to be the law of the land. There-
fore, the fact that Booth and Gathers were decided five-to-four should not make
them more susceptible to being overruled than any other Supreme Court decision.
Likewise, the fact that the four dissents were "spirited" should not be dispositive in
determining whether or not a precedent should stand. 35 A dissent by its very nat-
ure ought to be spirited; otherwise, the dissenter would probably be easy prey for
conversion to the majority's view.
124. Id. at 2621.
125. Id. at 2619.
126. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2627-28.
128. Id. at 2627.
129. Id. at 2627-28.
130. Id. at 2609.
131. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
Justice Marshall contended that special justification included "the advent of 'subsequent changes or development
in the law' that undermine a decision's rationale, the need 'to bring [a decision] into agreement with experience
and with facts newly ascertained,' and a showing that a particular precedent has become a 'detriment to coher-
ence and consistency in the law." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. Payne, III S. Ct. at 2609.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 2611.
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The principal problem with consistent application of Booth, "confusion over the
precise scope of its holding," was raised and resolved in South Carolina v. Gath-
ers. 36 Gathers extended the scope of the Booth holding to include prosecutorial
comment.I37 The Chief Justice further pointed to his dissent in Mills v. Maryland"8
to support his contention that Booth had defied consistent application. 3 ' Review of
Mills confirms Justice Marshall's declaration "[tihat [the] opinion does not con-
tain a single word about any supposed '[in] consistent application' of Booth in the
lower courts.' 4" Rehnquist's reference to State v. Heurtas, 4' where the majority
and the dissents had differing interpretations of the Booth opinions and footnotes,
as proof of the "[iniconsistent application of Booth by the lower courts," is ex-
tremely weak.'42 As Justice Marshall aptly pointed out,
if a division among the members of a single lower court in a single case were suffic-
ient to demonstrate that a particular precedent was a "detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law," there would hardly be a decision in the United States Reports
that we would not be obliged to reconsider.
The Chief Justice alleged that Booth had been inconsistently applied by lower
courts, plural, not by a lower court, and obviously did not support his position. '"
As a final support for his very easily met standard for disregarding the doctrine
of stare decisis, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court has done the
very same thing it did in Payne thirty-three times during the last twenty Terms. '45
"He did not, however, note that the average age of the overruled precedents in
those cases was 40 years, while Payne overruled a 2-year-old precedent."'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion also gives a less than accurate interpretation
of precedent. The Chief Justice asserted that a comparison of language in Gregg
with the language in Woodson supported the majority's position that victim impact
evidence must be heard. 47 This comparison takes Woodson and Gregg out of con-
text. These cases were decided in 1976, six years before the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982 was passed and eleven years before the Court addressed the
constitutionality of victim impact evidence in Booth. It is therefore unlikely that
the Woodson and Gregg Courts had victim impact evidence in mind when those de-
136. 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989), overruledby Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597 (1991). Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Gathers cites examples of differing interpretations of the Booth holding by lower courts prior to the
Gathers decision. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 813 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
138. 486 U.S. 367, 395 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. Payne, 111S. Ct. at 2611.
140. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990).
142. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611.
143. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 173 (1989)).
144. See Payne, IllS. Ct. at 2611.
145. Id. at 2610& n.1.
146. David 0. Stewart, Four Spirited Dissenters, A.B.A. J. Sept. 1991, at 40-41.
147. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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cisions were written. Chief Justice Rehnquist also completely ignored a critical
part of the language he quoted from Gregg limiting the evidence at a presentencing
hearing to that which does not prejudice the defendant. "
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Gathers,'49 made a somewhat appealing argument
for overruling precedent while the decision is still fresh error,150 stating:
Indeed, I had thought that the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather
than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence,
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity. The freshness of er-
ror . . . counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state
and federal laws and practices have been adjusted to embody it. . .particularly...
with respect to a decision such as Booth . . .purporting to reflect "evolving stand-
ards of decency" applicable to capital punishment.
15 1
Justice Scalia found support for his position in the following quote from Justice
Douglas: "A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to
revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all
else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss
which his predecessors may have put on it." 52
The following arguments were made by Justices White and Scalia in their dis-
senting opinions in Booth and by Justices O'Connor and Scalia in their dissenting
opinions in Gathers: (1) legislative determinations of appropriate sentencing con-
siderations are "peculiarly questions of legislative policy" entitled to judicial def-
erence;153 (2) punishment should be proportional not only to the defendant's guilt
but also to the harm caused; (3) victim impact statements provide the other side
of the defendant's mitigating evidence;155 (4) the Court should not presume that
the sentencing authority relied on the perceived worth of the victim to determine
sentencing harshness;15 1 (5) the Court's concern with the arbitrariness in sentenc-
ing that may result from victims' varying abilities to articulate grief and loss is mis-
placed as prosecutors and witnesses also vary in their ability to communicate;
15 7
and (6) victim impact statements are not inherently inflammatory, and the defend-
ant's inability to rebut victim impact evidence is speculative.158 It is inconceivable
148. See supra note 102-04 and accompanying text.
149. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
150. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 825 (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949)).
153. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 393 (1958)), overred by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
154. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting; Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gathers,
490 U.S. at 818-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting); Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting); Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517-18 (White, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 518; Gathers, 490 U.S. 822-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that the integrity of judicial review can be maintained when "fresh error" is noth-
ing more than not having the required number of votes at the appointed time.
Justice Marshall very accurately saw through the majority's rhetoric when he
bluntly stated that only the members of the Court had changed since Booth and
Gathers were decided. 5 9 When Booth was decided in 1987, the Supreme Court
consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, Blackmun, Brennan,
Stevens, Marshall, White, Scalia and O'Connor. 16 0 The Booth majority was made
up of Justices Powell, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall. 1 '
Between 1987 and the Gathers decision in 1989, Justice Powell, a moderate
and a member of the Booth majority, retired and was replaced by Justice Kennedy,
a conservative who joined the dissent 2 in Gathers. The only reason Booth with-
stood attack in Gathers was because Justice White refused to allow precedent to so
easily be disregarded, and, hence, voted with the remainder of the Booth major-
ity. '63 In the Gathers opinion, Justices O'Connor and Scalia stated in their dissents
that, given the opportunity, they would overturn Booth. 164 Thus, Payne was in the
offing.
Between 1989 and the Payne decision in 1991, Justice Brennan, a liberal and
part of the Booth and Gathers majorities, retired and was replaced by Justice Sou-
ter, a conservative who, writing a separate concurring opinion, voted to overrule
Booth and Gathers. 16 This left only Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall
firmly entrenched in opposition to the admissibility of victim impact evidence.
Justice White, perceiving greater support for his original stance in Booth, again
switched sides.
While Justice Marshall's opinion is wholly accurate, it may be considered
ironic by some that he should be delivering this message. Thurgood Marshall was
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1967 by President Lyndon Johnson. 6 When
Justice Marshall announced his retirement from the High Court on June 27, 1991,
the same day Payne was decided, he and Justice Byron White were the only re-
maining Warren Court Justices, as well as the only remaining Justices appointed
by a Democratic President.167 Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the Court ha[d]
been the most divided, if not the most divisive, in American History."'6 The vot-
ing record of the Warren Court on cases involving constitutional issues reveals that
.a percentage for the non-unanimous/dissenting [vote was] seldom less than 50
159. Payne v. Tennessee, 1 I1 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, lxxxiii (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
161. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497.
162. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J., concurring).
164. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
166. Bruce A. Green, "Power, Not Reason'. Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth Amendment in the Su-
preme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REv. 373 (1992) [hereinafter Green].
167. Id. at 373.
168. Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, The 'Warren Court, and The Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353,355
(1968) [hereinafter Kurland].
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[percent] and on one or two occasions exceed[ed] 80 [percent]."169 From 1953 to
1969, the Court shifted dramatically from adherence to the policy of judicial re-
straint to a position of judicial activism. 170 Out of this activism, the Warren Court
became a catalyst for racial equality through its school desegregation and reappor-
tionment decisions, a champion of a much broader First Amendment, 71 and an
insurer of fairness in criminal procedure.172 Justice Marshall thus joined, as its
first black Justice, an activist and controversial Supreme Court and wholeheart-
edly embraced the freedom to disagree as demonstrated by his unwavering posi-
tion regarding the death penalty despite his colleagues' opinions to the contrary.17
3
One scholar's interpretation of Justice Marshall's words, "'[p]ower, not reason,
is the new currency of this Court's decision-making,'" provides some explanation
for the apparent inconsistency between Justice Marshall's and Chief Justice Re-
hnquist's approach to stare decisis.' 74 By this statement, Justice Marshall is point-
ing out that the Court is determining the result it wishes to reach and then finding
the legal analysis to support that result.175 According to Justice Marshall, this
method of decision-making is backwards. 176 It is noteworthy that thirteen of the
thirty-three overruled decisions Chief Justice Rehnquist cited in the Payne opinion
were Warren Court decisions. 177 Five of the thirteen were overruled by the Re-
hnquist Court and the remaining eight by the Burger Court.'78 Some see this as a
renaissance of judicial restraint,1 79 and the fact that the Court is dominated by con-
servative, Republican-appointed Justices explains this revival and supports Justice
Marshall's "power, not reason" and "personnel change" theories as the impetus be-
hind the Payne majority.
169. William F. Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutional Revolution, 23 VANO. L. REv. 205,
210 (1970) [hereinafter Swindler]; see also Kurland, supra note 168, at 355 (comparing the voting record of the
last five-year period of the Warren Court).
170. Swindler, supra note 169, at 231-41. "[T]he doctrine of activism was the obligation of the judiciary to
identify the specific rights to be guaranteed within the broad and unspecific guarantee. Id. at 238.
171. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172. Symposium, The Warren Court: An Editorial Preface, 67 MiCH. L. REv. 219,220 (1968).
173. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358-59 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan was the
only Justice to agree with Marshall's opposition to capital punishment). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
619 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 336-37 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. Green, supra, note 166, at 375 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Bruce A. Green, an Associate Professor of law at Fordham University, served as a law clerk to Jus-
tice Marshall during the 1982 Term. Id. at 373.
175. Id. at 375-76.
176. Id. at n.11.
177. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2610-11 n. 1 (1991).
178. Id.
179. Isidore Silver, The Warren Court Critics: Where are They Now That We Need Them?, 3 HAsTiNGS CONST.
L.Q. 373, 444-52 (1976).
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A relatively small percentage of murderers are sentenced to death. 8 ' In fact,
since the Furman decision, the Supreme Court has consistently held that statutes
which do not provide "rational criteria that narrow the [sentencer's] judgment as to
whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the threshold [be-
low which the death penalty cannot be imposed]"181 and which do not provide for
consideration of any relevant information offered by the defendant which might
cause the sentencer not to return the death penalty"82 violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.l" Yet, statistical information indicates that juror bias may in fact play a part
in capital sentencing decisions.
The Baldus Study researched 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970's.l
The research showed that the death penalty was meted out in twenty-two percent
of the cases studied where the defendant was black and the victim was white.
18 5
However, the death sentence was returned in only eight percent of the cases in
which both the defendant and the victim were white.186 Only one percent of the
black defendants and three percent of the white defendants who had murdered
black victims received the death penalty.8 7 It is important to note that the Baldus
Study was conducted prior to the use of victim impact evidence in capital sentenc-
ing. 8 The bias demonstrated by these statistics, especially the wide chasm be-
tween death sentences in black defendant/white victim and black defendant/black
victim cases, can only be exacerbated by the introduction of victim impact state-
ments in death penalty cases.
The Supreme Court in McClskey v. Kemp refused to find that McCleskey's
death sentence was unconstitutionally based on the Baldus Study statistics, since
180. SAMuEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DIscRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SEN-
TENCING 3 (1989) [hereinafter GROSS & MAURo]. Between 1976 and 1980, it is estimated that almost 102,000
non-negligent criminal homicides were committed in the United States fbr which 96,170 arrests were made. Id.
During this time period, 1,011 death sentences were pronounced, a ratio of approximately 100 homicides for
every death sentence. Id.
181. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
182. Id. at 306.
183. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
184. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski and George Wentworth per-
formed a statistical study known as the "Baldus Study" purporting "to show disparity in the imposition of the




187. Id. at 286.
188. Research similar to the Baldus Study, and with similar results, has been conducted in North Carolina,
South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas and Virginia.
See GEN. Gov'T Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RE-
SEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RAcIAL DIsPARITIEs (1990) (examining all twenty-eight of the post-Furman studies
that have investigated the relationship between race and death sentencing); WILLIAM J. BowERs, EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA (1974) (including research results not only in the United States but also in Canada and several European
countries); GRoss & MAURO, supra note 180, at 3-10; Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those
Who Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REv. 1 (1991).
1993]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
the statistics did not prove that racial considerations influenced his particular sen-
tence. 18 Dissenting, Justice Brennan19 stated:
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human community itself of-
ten speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand for punishment. It is
the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that
the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life ....
[T]he way we choose those who will die reveals the depth of moral commitment
among the living. 9
McCleskey was decided just six months before Booth, and Justice Brennan's words
were telling as to the Court's traditional emphasis on the defendant's moral culpa-
bility in capital cases. Payne thus represents a dramatic shift away from this em-
phasis, which has been the Court's main concern in death penalty cases at least
since the Furman decision, if not before, toward a focus on the rights of victims.
This shift necessarily raises the issue of the viability of the whole body of death
penalty precedents.
In Zant v. Stephens,192 the Supreme Court cited Arnold v. State,19' in which the
Georgia Supreme Court held that the statutory aggravating circumstance of"a sub-
stantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" was unconstitutionally
vague because it did not give the "sufficiently clear and objective standards" nec-
essary to control jury discretion in capital sentencing.1 94 The Zant Court stated
that to escape this "void for vagueness" problem, "an aggravating circumstance
must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant com-
pared to others found guilty of murder."19 Although the Court has not classified it
as such, it is probable that victim impact evidence would be considered an aggra-
vating circumstance and would arguably, given the results of the Baldus Study and
similar research, expand rather than narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty. States have enacted varying schemes as to the format of victim im-
pact statements, but most states' victim impact legislation allows the parole depart-
ment or a similar agency to determine the specific content of the victim impact
statement.19' By allowing the sentencing authority to consider evidence on which
neither the state judicial system nor the state legislature has placed any specific
guidelines, the Payne Court disregards Zant as well as the Court's established
189. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987).
190. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 343 -44.
192.462 U.S. 862 (1983).
193. 224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976).
194. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 n. 16 (citingArnold, 224 S.E.2d at 391-92).
195. Id. at 877.




proposition that "where the ultimate penalty of death is at issue a system of stan-
dardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."197
A further hitch in the typical statutory scheme is that a victim impact statement
will only be taken if the Court orders a presentence report. 198 One of the objectives
of the Furman Court was to ensure that there was a "meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many in
which it is not." 99 These varying legislative schemes, combined with the possibil-
ity that a victim impact statement may not be heard, abrogates this objective. It is
also interesting to note that while the Supreme Court is now willing to allow a vic-
tim's family to testify at sentencing as to what they think the defendant's punish-
ment should be, there is a considerable difference of opinion in both state and
lower federal courts concerning the admissibility of expert testimony during sen-
tencing "concerning or affecting the appropriate sentence . . . to be meted to a
criminal defendant after a conviction."200 And, while victim impact statements are
prepared by the parole department,
over the last decade many states have diminished or entirely abolished the use of pa-
role boards ... for determining release dates. As a result, the personal idiosyncra-
cies and shortcomings of parole board members have been eliminated and replaced
with objective determinations pursuant to concrete formulae with which the inmate
... can easily figure out her anticipated date of release.20 1
The basis of the argument for allowing victim impact evidence is that it makes
sentencing fair not only for the defendant but also for the victim. However, Payne
leaves open at least two issues: (1) can the defense essentially assault the character
of the victim impact statement proponent, and (2) can the prosecution introduce
victim impact evidence if the defendant does not offer evidence of his good charac-
ter?
VI. CONCLUSION
The death penalty is different from any other punishment in our criminal jus-
tice system.20 2 Once it has been carried out, there is no appeal and no parole. The
sentencing authority, whether a judge or jury, is composed of human beings who
197. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976).
198. McLeod, supra note 7, at 508-09.
199. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
200. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (allowing predictions of future nondangerousness
based on evidence of good conduct in jail as a mitigating factor during the penalty phase of capital trials); Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 905-06 (1983) (verifying admissibility of psychiatric testimony on future danger-
ousness); Michael L. Radelet & James W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During Penalty Phases of
Capital Trials, 54 ALB. L. REv. 845 (1990) [hereinafter Radelet & Marquart] (discussing actuarial methods of
predicting a capital defendant's dangerousness or nondangerousness and concluding that because neither of these
methods could produce accurate predictions, many will be executed to ensure that the one unlikely recidivist will
not kill again); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility ofExpert Testimony as to Appropriate Punishment for
Convicted Defendant, 47 A.L.R. 4th 1069 (1986).
201. Radelet & Marquart, supra note 200, at 853 (footnote omitted).
202. The principle that death is different has been called into question, though not completely discarded, by the
recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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have all of the gory facts of the crime before it and is, therefore, capable of surmis-
ing the grief and agony that the crime has caused the victim and his or her family.
The court is a place where the defendant, not the victim is tried, and the cathartic
benefits that victim impact statements may give a victim do not help the sentenc-
ing authority decide whether the defendant is of the relatively small number of
murderers who deserves to die for his or her crime. Defendants should waive their
right to a presentence report to avoid the potential for arbitrary sentencing based
on the victim impact statement contained therein.
